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1 Abstract
Inverse precoding algorithms in multimode fiber based communication networks
are used to exploit mode dependent losses on the physical layer. This provides
an asymmetry between legitimate (Bob) and unlegitimate (Eve) receiver of mes-
sages resulting in a significant SNR advantage for Bob. In combination with
dynamic mode channel changes, Eve has no chance to reconstruct a sent mes-
sage even in a worst case scenario in which she is almighty. This is the first time,
Physical Layer Security in a fiber optical network is investigated on the basis of
measured transmission matrices. These results show that messages can be sent
securely with conventional communication techniques. Translating the task of
securing data from software to hardware represents the potential of a scientific
paradigm shift. The introduced technique is a step towards the development of
cyber physical systems.
2 Introduction
The number of exchanged data via internet has increased exponentially in recent
years [1]. Following this trend, the amount of sensitive data has increased in
the same way and thus the importance of information security. Today the most
commonly used technique warranting secure communication is based on digital
cryptographic keys, which exploit the complexity of multiplying large prime
numbers [2]. However, cryptographic algorithms are facing several challenges.
First, they are vulnerable against unexpected technological developments, as
parallel networks of computers are breaking codes that have been considered
safe in polynomial time using high-performance computers [3, 4]. Second, the
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demands which are addressing the physical embodiments of these functions go
beyond the constraints of conventional semiconductor technology. Third, a thief
stealing a digital key can go unnoticed.
Overcoming the drawbacks of computational cryptography, investigations of
physical cryptographic methods have been made [5, 6, 7, 8]. Physical unclon-
able functions (PUFs) are physical objects, that can not feasibly be copied due
to their comprehensive number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, they have
been studied as a physical one-time pad [9] and as a secure physical authentica-
tion protocol [10, 11, 3, 12], respectively. In both scenarios optical PUFs were
generated by illuminating scattering media.
One-time pads are information theoretically secure, however the realization
is highly impractical as both the sender (e.g. Alice) as well as the receiver (e.g.
Bob) of a message cannot synchronize their channel without having exactly the
same unique PUF.
In applications where PUFs were utilized to create secure authentication, the
security relies on the difficulty of cloning the optical response [3], as well as in
combination with a low mean photon number [10, 11]. This physical encryption
technique always assumes that Alice and Bob have access to the PUF in an
initial calibration step, which is not observed by a possible eavesdropper (e.g.
Eve). This is a major problem, as due to statistical fluctuations in the light
path caused by temperature, mechanical stress and local phase-shifts, the PUF
is changing in time. Consequently, Alice and Bob need to recalibrate their
channel which is not practical when Eve is not supposed to watch the calibration
procedure.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is another technique which addresses the
secure transmission of data. QKD utilizes the inimitability of unknown quantum
states to make the reconstruction of encrypted messages impossible [13, 14].
Even though QKD offers an unconditionally secure data transmission, serious
problems arise when combining QKD signals with optical amplifier noise and
classical communications [15, 16] on a conventional fiber optical infrastructure.
The use of multimode fibers (MMF) in fiber optical networks is regarded as
a promising approach to increase possible data rates significantly. However, the
phenomenon of mode scrambling inside an MMF was considered as a hurdle for
the MMF usage for a long time. Once coherent light is sent into the MMF on one
side of the fiber, it will appear as a granulated structure on the other side of the
MMF called speckle pattern. This barrier was overcome with the development of
wavefront shaping (WS) [17]. Firstly, it became feasible in optical engineering
to control the propagation of light through fluctuating surfaces by WS [18],
secondly the light control through MMFs has not only become possible, but
much more important. Nowadays, the MMF is a key device in several fields of
research. They are used in biophotonical applications [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26] to gain access to hard-to-reach areas due to their flexibility and high number
of degrees of freedom in a minimum space. These properties are particularly
helpful for image transmission using the MMF as an ultrathin endoscope. In
addition, achievable data rates in communication networks can be significantly
increased using MMFs, since they can be used to develop novel multiplexing
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techniques in which space is a scalable parameter [27, 28, 29, 30].
Further, the property of light scrambling inside an MMF has opened the door
to increase the level of information security as the scattering characteristics are
completely random. Therefore, by controlling the transmission channel between
Alice and Bob using WS, Eve, who is tapping off the signal somewhere in the
center of the fiber, will only receive a scrambled speckle pattern. Additionally,
this idea has been investigated in combination with a low photon number, so
that Eve only receives a fraction of information [2]. However, The approach
presented has two major drawbacks. On the one hand, a low-photon source is
used, which is impractical with regard to desired transmission distances in fiber
optical networks. On the other hand, it is assumed that Eve has no access to
the transmission channel between Alice and Bob during the calibration phase.
For realistic scenarios it is unknown whether an eavesdropper is able to witness
the calibration or not. Thus a data transmission can only be considered secure,
when Eve is allowed to watch the calibration.
In this paper, a novel approach to enhance the information security in fiber
optical networks using physical layer security (PLS) is introduced. In this ap-
proach a step back to the basic understanding of the underlying channel model
is made [31]. As introduced in [32], the modes supported by the MMF are un-
evenly exiting the MMF if someone is tapping off light between Alice and Bob.
This phenomenon arises from the physics of the MMF [33] and is called mode
dependent loss (MDL), which is the key assumption of the introduced model.
Consequently, in the developed setup a conventional coherent light source is
used. The attacker Eve is allowed to have access to the communication channel
during the calibration phase between Alice and Bob. Thus, Eve has knowledge of
the transmission matrix (TM ) between Alice and her, as well as the TM between
Alice and Bob. Eve’s supremacy, which is assumed in the introduced method,
represents the main difference between PLS and other techniques designed to
ensure information security.
3 Measurement of the Multimode Fiber’s Trans-
mission Matrix
The TM approach proved to be extremely helpful to overcome the challenge
to use the MMF either as an imaging [22, 23, 24, 25, 26] or data transmitting
tool [34, 30] for compensating the fiber’s light scrambling property. Besides
experimental techniques to determine the TM , approaches to identify the TM
via deep learning [35, 36] or convex optimization algorithms [37] have already
been shown.
The TM describes the linear and complex relationship between input and
output of the MMF exactly. Hence it is possible to compensate the mode
scrambling process during light transmission by inverting the TM to pre-distort
the incident light signal [34, 30, 24]. Consequently, the TM offers excellent
possibilities to control the light transmission through the MMF. Furthermore,
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knowledge of the TM of the MMF is required for performance characterization
employing Mode Division Multiplexing (MDM) in order to recover channels by
optical means [34].
There are several ways possible to acquire a TM of an MMF experimentally.
In a first step, a set of linear independent patterns, which sufficiently describe
light entering and exiting the MMF, need to be chosen. These patterns are the
basis of the TM . Generally, a WS element like a spatial light modulator (SLM) is
used to spatially shape an incident Gaussian laser beam imprinting each pattern
of the set onto it. Afterwards, the modulated light field is imaged onto the input
fiber facet where a certain group of modes of the MMF’s mode domain is excited
and propagates through the MMF. The light, which is exiting the MMF has to
be measured and decomposed into the domain of the previously chosen set of
independent patterns. After this process has been repeated for every pattern of
the set, the measured complex decomposition coefficients are stored row by row
forming the TM .
In 2010 the results of the first TM measurement in optics have been pub-
lished [38], where the light propagation through a random scattering sample was
investigated. By using a phase-only SLM, Hadamard patterns, whose elements
are either +1 or −1 in amplitude, were chosen as the basis for the TM . However,
this procedure was developed for a sample having generalized scattering proper-
ties. There are more practical ways to acquire the TM of a MMF depending on
the targeted application. Using the MMF as an flexible endoscope, the aim is
to generate scanning focal spots at the end of the fiber. Therefore it is obvious
to choose diffraction limited focal spots [23, 26, 25] as the TM basis. Another
suitable basis to describe light transmission through an MMF is a basis of plane
waves with varying spatial frequencies [24]. One major advantage in this ap-
proach is the simplicity of the Fourier transform relationship between the plane
wave basis and the physical pixel basis of the SLM, respectively the camera.
However, in terms of measurement and computational effort, it is beneficial to
work with the smallest possible basis. In MMF applications the smallest pos-
sible basis is represented by the MMF’s mode domain with the number of N
modes. Both the plane wave and the focal spot as well as the Hadamard bases
are larger than N . In [39, 34, 30], the chosen bases are the MMF’s mode do-
main, respectively. They use two SLMs, one on each side of the MMF. One SLM
is used to adaptively generate complex light fields spatially according to each
mode of the MMF’s mode domain for exciting the modes the MMF supports
sequentially. The modulated light fields are shaped in amplitude and phase with
a phase-only SLM by applying special phase masks using the simulated anneal-
ing method [40]. The second SLM is then used to demultiplex the scrambled
light field based on a correlation filter method, where the efficiency of diffracted
light off the SLM surface into a power meter is proportional to the correlation
of the fiber output with a desired mode. The given measurement effort per
decomposition process is 4N − 3 per polarization [39].
In this paper, the optical setup [Fig. 1] which has been introduced in [41]
is used to measure the TM of a step-index MMF (THORLABS M68L, ∅25µm,
NA=0.1) with exactly N measurements. The utilized light source is an 532nm
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solid state laser (LaserQuantum, TORUS). This combination leads to a mode
domain of 55 modes per polarization direction. Mode selective excitation is
performed using amplitude and phase modulation based on superpixel phase
masks with a single spatial light modulator (HOLOEYE Pluto, 8bit phase-only
SLM). The light that propagates through the MMF is holographically measured
using conventional off-axis digital holography. The measured complex light
field is then decomposed into the MMF’s mode domain. For this step, the
orthogonality of the mode field distributions in the mode domain is exploited
and a complex series expansion is carried out. Using this technique, one row of
the N ×N TM is measured in single-shot.
Figure 1: Optical setup, which is used to measure the TM of an MMF.
4 Recovering Individual Transmission Channels
of Multimode Fibers Using Transmission Ma-
trix Inverse Precoding
Once the TM of an MMF is measured, the complete light transmission charac-
teristic between input ~xA on Alice’s side and output ~yB on Bob’s side of the
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MMF is determined:
~yB = TM,AB · ~xA + nB , (1)
where TM,AB is the TM between Alice and Bob and nB is the measurement noise
on Bob’s side. The input vector ~xA is defined as follows to ensure an average
constant transmission power:
~xA =
~xA
||~xA|| . (2)
Alice is able to undo the scrambling property of the MMF by inverting the TM .
Tikhonov inversion is used for inverting the TM , because it is robust against
influence of noise. In the following, inverted matrices are marked with a super-
script †. The Tikhonov inversion is performing an regularization process and
has already been used in biophotonic applications [24, 38]. The regularization
parameter has been chosen as 12% of the maximum singular value of the TM .
After superimposing the inverted TM T
†
M,AB to the input signal ~xA, the new
input ~ˆx can be described as:
~ˆxA = T
†
M,AB~xA, (3)
with
~ˆxA =
~ˆxA√
tr{T †M,ABT †,HM,AB}
. (4)
The superscripted H indicates a Hermitian transpose operation. Replacing ~xA
of equation (1) with ~ˆxA of equation (3), it is possible for Bob to observe the
signal directly without performing any signal processing according to the model
equations:
~yB = TM,AB~ˆxA + nB
= TM,ABT
†
M,AB~xA + nB
= ~xA + nB .
(5)
Using the new input signal calculation rule [Eq. (3)], Alice gets the required
combinations of complex mode weights to make a specific output signal appear
on Bob’s side. Shaping such complex light field distributions requires an adap-
tive optical device with a high modulation depth like an SLM. If the TM is
measured again using the mode domain base with inverse precoding, the ampli-
tude distribution of the TM will be very similar to an identity matrix. In Figure
2 TM measurements of MMFs of different lengths are shown. The efficiency
of the inverse precoding process ηp can be quantified by calculating the mean
optical power, which is located on the diagonal elements of the diagonalized
TM s P d with respect to the mean optical power, which is distributed over the
background entries P b [23]:
ηp =
P d
P d + P b
(6)
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Figure 2: (a)-(c) TM measurements of step-index MMF’s of different lengths,
as well as (d)-(f) pre-coded diagonalized TM measurements. The individual
images show the pure amplitude values of the complex-valued TM s. The LPl,m
modes are sorted ascending first by their l index and then by their m index:
LP01, LP02, · · ·LP11, · · ·LPLM . (a)-(c) TM measurements of 10 cm, 1 m and 2 m
MMFs, respectively. (d)-(f) diagonalized TM s of 10 cm, 1 m and 2 m MMFs,
respectively.
The efficiencies of the individual precoding processes shown in Figure 2 are
distributed as follows: the precoding of the 10cm MMF in Figure 2(d) has an
efficiency of 95%, while the efficiency of the 1m MMF Figure 2(e) was 90% and
89%, respectively, for the 2m MMF in Figure 2(f). These results show that the
inverse precoding process can also be efficiently performed on MMFs up to 2m
in length. Thus, the mean transported power in the individual channels can be
transmitted with an efficiency of at least 89%.
5 Parallel Mode Division Multiplexing of mul-
tiple individual spatial fiber modes
The diagonalization of the MMF by means of inverse precoding not only has
the advantage that Bob receives Alice’s message directly without having to per-
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form further signal processing, but since the individual spatial fiber modes were
selected as the basis of the TM , MDM can be employed. In addition, by super-
imposing superpixel phasemasks which are generating individual complex mode
distributions on Bob’s side, Alice is able to transmit Data on multiple channels
simultaneously as shown in Figure 3. By the transmission of a light signal of
constant power over several channels, the power is distributed to the individ-
ual channels. As a result, the average signal level decreases with increasing
number of channels. The magnitude of the received mode coefficient in Fig-
ure 3(a) is approximately 0.62, while the average magnitude is approximately
0.4 in Figure 3(c). This constitutes a performance limitation of MDM in this
system, which could be compensated by increasing the laser power. Neverthe-
less, assuming that simple thresholding is used, Alice can now choose between
55×54×53 = 157.410 transferable symbols. This corresponds to a 17 bit trans-
mission system. Using the SLM with an repetition rate of 60 Hz, Alice could
achieve a transmission rate of approximately 7.5 Mbit with a cw laser of only
one wavelength.
Figure 3: Parallel MDM of (a) one, (b) two and (c) three individual spatial fiber
modes of an 1m step-index MMF.
6 Realization of Physical Layer Security in Fiber
Optical Networks
As already mentioned in detail in the introduction, in the communication sce-
nario presented here Eve is given access to the transmission channel between
Alice and Bob from the beginning. Therefore, she has the possibility to measure
both the TM between Alice and Bob and the TM between Alice and her. She
gains access to the transmission channel by tapping into the fiber via a splicing
process without interrupting the signal as shown in Figure 4. Like Bob, she will
also evaluate the light signal emitted from the MMF holographically.
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Figure 4: Eavesdropping scenario. Eve splices herself on the MMF used as a
transmission channel between Alice and Bob. She will already listen during the
calibration phase between Alice and Bob and thus knows the TM between Alice
and Bob. The light which is exiting on Eve’s side is of sufficient intensity, but
so low that Eve’s listening process is not registered. She is able to examine the
light field distribution e.g. holographically.
The light transmission process between Alice and Eve can be described as fol-
lows:
~yE = TM,AE~ˆxA + nE
= TM,AET
†
M,AB~xA + nE
(7)
whereas the noise level on Bob’s side nB has the same level as on Eve’s side nE .
According to [15] the probability for coupling modes into Eves tapping fiber
is mode dependent. This process can be described using a diagonal matrix V ,
which is inserted into the transfer function, which carries the mode-dependent
power loss coefficients σ2i on the diagonal elements representing the MDL char-
acteristic of the MMF:
V =
σ
2
1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 σ2N
 , (8)
where σmin << 1 and σmax = 1, which results in the following transmission
relation:
~yE =
√
V TM,AET
†
M,AB~xA + nE (9)
9
As soon as Eve wants to decode an observed message ~yE , she has to invert the
measured TM H =
√
V TM,AET
†
M,AB :
y˜E = H
†~yE
= ~xA +H
†nE ,
(10)
with The introduced relationships lead to two important observations:
1. Due to the fact that values between 0 and 1 are located on the diagonal
elements of V , the entries of H are attenuated. This will lead to noise
amplification during Eve’s inversion process.
2. Due to Alices’s inverse precoding, Alice directly influences Eve’s noise
term [Eq.(10)], but not Bob’s noise term [Eq. (5)].
Possible influences of the two presented findings are examined in more detail in
the following simulation model.
7 Security Analysis of a Multimode Fiber Opti-
cal Network using Physical Layer Security
In the simulation the introduced communication, respectively eavesdropping
model, is set up with the measured transmission matrices. In order to quantify
the level of security using PLS, the quality of the two output signals ~yB and ~yE
on Bob’s and Eve’s side is compared over the different mode channels with vary-
ing eavesdropping conditions. Both Bob and Eve perform thresholding during
their detection, since dynamic channel changes are taken into account. While
Bob can easily detect the message, due to Alice’s inverse precoding [Eq.(5)],
Eve compensates for the channel by a Tikhonov matrix inversion [Eq.(10)]. The
Signal-To-Noise-Ratio (SNR) of the detected signal is given as the performance
parameter:
SNR = 10 · log10
( |~yi,signal|2
|~yi,background|2
)
(11)
First, we assume that the pure transmission characteristics are the same for
both Bob and Eve. For this reason we assume for both the same measured
TM from Figure 2(a) (TM,AE = TM,AB). In addition, it is assumed for the
simulation that the same additive white Gaussian noise occurs on both sides. If
the MDL’s were neglected, both output equations [Eq. (5) and Eq. (10)] would
be identical. However, in the presented communication model the MDL’s are
of course considered using the coupling matrix V . In [15] two different coupling
matrices were considered. It was assumed that the attenuation of modes is either
i) logarithmic or ii) linear but always randomly distributed over the individual
mode channels. In order to make an accurate selection of the Matrix V , power
crosstalk was simulated using an Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD) based
evanescent field coupling process [?]. Individual modes of the MMF were excited
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in a straight MMF piece (case: transmission from Alice to Bob) and another
straight MMF piece was placed next to it (case: coupling to Eve). This scenario
was chosen based on the following consideration: Eve would splice the core of
her MMF as close to the core of Alice’s and Bob’s MMF as she would receive
sufficient intensity but would not be detected. The simulation results show
that there is a deterministic relationship between the coupling behavior and the
mode field distribution [see Supplement 1]. The coupling process depends on
the spatial distribution of the mode field power. Is the field power concentrated
at the edge of the core, a particularly high proportion of the power is coupled
to Eve’s fiber (6.5% in the highest order mode), whereas particularly low power
is coupled for lower order modes, where the main part of the power is guided
in the center of the core (0.018% in the lowest order mode). For simplicity it is
now assumed that during a splicing process the highest order mode is coupled
without attenuation, i.e. a coupling factor of 1 is assigned to the last entry
in the V matrix. The lowest order mode now experiences an attenuation of
1
6.5/0.018 = 0.0028, which is noted in the first entry of V . The attenuation
values of the modes between these extreme values were now selected according
to the following scheme: the proportion of the power of the field in the edge area
in relation to the total total power of the core were calculated for all modes.
The behaviour of this curve has now been scaled to the coupling factor values
0.0028 to 1. The result was taken as the diagonal entries of V and can be seen
in Figure 5. The same V matrix is assumed for all subsequent investigations.
If V is now taken into account for the eavesdropping scenario, its influence can
Figure 5: V matrix representing the coupling characteristic for Eve. The trend
of the diagonal entries was chosen proportional to the power ratio in the edge
area to the total power of the core of the respective modes.
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be investigated as follows. A digital ’1’ is sent successively over each of the
55 available mode channels and the output signals on both Bob’s and Eve’s
side are compared with regard to the SNR [Eq. 11]. In Figure 6, a significant
difference can be observed on the mode channels on which a higher attenuation
was present. On the channels where a lower or no attenuation was assumed,
the SNR behaves almost the same for both Bob and Eve. Due to the fact that
the TM of Eve was provided with attenuation weights, the entries of the TM
at the locations with high attenuation are low in value. This causes a noise
amplification during Eve’s TM inversion performed during detection, whereby
the values of the SNR decrease significantly of up to ≈ 20dB in the worst case.
This provides a crucial asymmetry between Eve and Bob.
Figure 6: SNR plotted against the individual mode channels. Sequentially a
digital ’1’ was transmitted over the mode channels and in Bob’s and Eve’s
received signals the SNR was calculated, respectively.
As mentioned in the previous section, the inverse precoding approach gives Alice
the power to manipulate Eve’s noise term. Alice thus can artificially add white
Gaussian noise n˜ to the transmitted signal ~xA from equation (3):
~˜xA = T
†
M,AB(~xA + n˜). (12)
The influence of the noise amplitudes on the mode channels can be deduced.
Figure 7 shows two plots where the colour-coded SNR was calculated for both
Bob’s and Eve’s sides for every available mode channel with increasing noise
amplitude (maximum 100% with respect to signal amplitude), respectively. In
the simulation, a digital ’1’ was again sent sequentially via all mode channels.
As Bob and Eve use thresholding the SNR was only calculated for the case if the
correct mode was detected. If the detection failed, the SNR value is set to −∞
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artificially. If the SNR drops to −∞ on Eve’s side, the channel is considered
safe for Alice and Bob. As can be clearly seen in Figure 7, the amplitude
of the artificial noise level has a significant influence on the signal quality at
Eve’s side. Bob, on the other hand, can almost consistently measure the correct
signal, even if Alice adds a noise to her transmitted signal that has the same
amplitude as the actual signal. If one now performs a line scan in the two SNR
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: SNR for (a) Bob’s and (b) Eve’s detection respectively plotted over all
55 mode channels with increasing noise level. A ’1’ was sent sequentially over
each channels with increasing noise level and both Bob’s and Eve’s signals were
evaluated. It should be noted that Eve multiplies her signal by the inverted TM
H† before evaluation, as shown in equation (10). Bob, on the other hand, easily
detects the signal sent by Alice due to her inverse precoding [Eq. (5)].
evaluations shown in Figure 8 at 50% noise, it can be seen that Bob has an
almost constant SNR level of 12dB. Additionally, there are 4 secure channels
where Eve cannot decrypt the message sent by Alice, if Alice performs dynamic
13
channel changes. With the presented technique the asymmetry between Bob and
Eve is exploited to the highest degree, because Alice and Bob can communicate
securely. By generating several secure channels it is also possible to increase the
secure goodput, as it was introduced for wireless and optical communication
channels in [43]. One way to achieve this is by adjusting the artificial noise
level, as the number of secure channels can be changed.
Figure 8: A line scan from Figure 7 at a noise level of 50% at both Bob’s and
Eve’s side. At this noise level, the mode channels 1, 6, 19, and 33 are safe,
because Eve’s detection on these channels is faulty. However, it can also be
seen that Eve has a higher SNR than Bob for the signal detection of the mode
channels that are particularly favourable for her (here, for example, channels
48 and up). This is due to the fact that Eve makes an inversion at the signal
detection, which is not done by Bob. It is possible that the signal powers at the
channels that are favourable for Eve are amplified and ultimately higher than
on Bob’s side.
8 Secure information Transmission Using Mode
division multiplexing
In the previous section it was shown that at a noise level of 50% there are 4
secure available channels for Alice to communicate over. In addition, it was
shown that with the presented optical setup messages can be sent over several
mode channels independently and simultaneously, or MDM can be performed
via 3 modes. Now, that up to 3 modes can be transmitted simultaneously and
safely [Fig. 9(a)], it can be seen that on Eve’s side, the detection at a noise
level of about 50% and above consistently fails, while Bob always receives the
message in the correct way. It is also possible to transmit a message securely,
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even if not all individual channels are classified as secure [Fig. 9(b)]. In the
example shown here, it was always possible to transmit a message consisting of
3 bits securely via two secure channels and one arbitrary insecure channel. It
is therefore possible to send messages with three channels from the entire mode
domain as long as two channels, which are classified as safe, are involved in the
message. Alice should add an artificial noise with a noise level of about 50% of
the signal amplitude to her signal to ensure security.
(a)
(b)
Figure 9: SNR plotted against the increasing artificial noise level. Thresholding
was used both on Bob’s and Eve’s side to detect the transmitted message (three
times ’1’) (a) over three safe mode channels 1, 6 and 19 and (b) over two safe
mode channels 1, 6, as well as one unsafe mode channel 50.
9 Discussion
The TM measurements shown here with subsequent inversion were performed
on step-index MMFs of different lengths. The efficiency of diagonalization de-
creased from 95% at 10 cm to 89% at 2 m length. On the one hand, the de-
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creasing efficiency can be explained by the fact that manufacturing tolerances
play a greater role with increasing fiber lengths. The manufacturer specifies
a tolerance of 10% for both the NA and the core radius. On the other hand,
MMFs with a step-index profile are said to be more difficult to control than, for
example, MMFs with a graded-index profile [44]. For simplicity, a step-index
profile was nevertheless used, since a mode domain of 55 modes per polarization
at 532nm is to be expected here. The MMF with the smallest possible available
core radius of 50µm with a gradient-index profile has a mode domain with 1033
modes per polarization at 532nm. The goal of this paper was to proof the con-
cept of PLS. For that reason, the focus so far has not been on using as many
modes as possible, which is why using 1033 modes would go beyond the scope.
The mode-selective excitation ensures a TM having the smallest possible
base. However, this technique is associated with a high adjustment effort, where
smaller inaccuracies in the adjustment can induce a large extent of error. For
example, the SLM is mapped to the input facet of the MMF at a scale of
≈ 1 : 600. Other techniques using a Fourier pixels [24] or scanning focal points
[23] base are much easier to realize. However, in order to perform MDM, the
measured TM would have to be translated back into the mode space via a
conversion matrix, which increases the susceptibility to errors due to numerical
inaccuracies. In addition, the number of measurements for a complete TM is
much higher with alternative techniques, which is why the most elegant but
also most difficult technique using mode-selective excitation was chosen for the
setup presented here.
The matrices measured with the introduced principle were used to perform
an inverse precoding, so that communication can be done over arbitrary modes
of the mode domain. Experimentally, it was shown that MDM can be performed
with up to 3 independent modes via thresholding. Theoretically it would also
be possible to communicate over more than 3 channels simultaneously, but this
technique is limited by the inverse precoding quality. The number of SLM
pixels used would be another limiting factor, but currently 130x130 superpixels
are used for the excitation of modes, which should in principle suffice for the
simultaneous excitation of all modes.
The assumptions made for the eavesdropping scenario are favoring Eve’s
role. In reality, Eve is not almighty and the coupling coefficients are not scaled
down to the very optimistic value 1, i.e. completely without attenuation. Even
under this hypothesis, it could be shown that if Alice adds artificial noise with
50% signal amplitude to her transmitted signal, there are 4 mode channels which
can be classified as safe. The number of safe channels could, of course, change
if the fiber parameters such as core radius or refractive index profile change.
10 Conclusion
Inverse precoding with artificial noise enables secure communication even if Eve
knows the transmission matrices and is present during the calibration. The key
for this is the exploitation of mode dependent losses which are characteristic
16
for the channel behaviour inside MMFs. While Bob directly observes the sent
modes, Eve needs to use matrix inversion. This gives Alice the power to intro-
duce artificial noise and thus to amplify the noise Eve detects. This results in
an SNR advantage for Bob, which is high enough to generate 4 mode channels
in our exemplary simulation that can be considered to be secure as dynamic
channel changes are used. In combination with MDM this is even enhanced.
Messages can be sent safely over 3 channels from the entire mode domain, as
long as 2 channels classified as safe are used. These results represent a crucial
advancement for increasing the security in optical transmission channels with
potential impact on data centers and cyber physical systems.
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